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Andrew Ross Sorkin on Market Bubbles, Banking Rules, and the Real Lessons of 1929

56 min episode · 2 min read
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Episode

56 min

Read time

2 min

Topics

Investing, Fundraising & VC, Software Development

AI-Generated Summary

Key Takeaways

  • Pre-crash valuations debate: Stock prices before 1929 crash may have been rational bets on America's century of growth, with thirty-year returns from 1929-1959 delivering approximately 6% real returns despite the Depression. The crash severity resulted from policy mistakes and unlucky events like World War Two rather than fundamental overvaluation, suggesting speculators were more correct than contemporary critics like Irving Fisher.
  • Leverage amplification mechanics: Individual investors in 1929 used 10-to-1 margin loans from proliferating brokerage houses, meaning a 50% stock decline triggered forced liquidations of not just equities but homes and other assets. This leverage dynamic, not just price levels, created the cascading crisis—a pattern repeated in 2008 with subprime mortgages where underwater homeowners couldn't meet payment obligations.
  • Federal Reserve political constraints: Fed board members' diaries from the 1920s reveal they feared Congressional backlash after raising rates in 1920-1921, viewing themselves as an experimental institution. They recognized speculation was excessive but believed tamping it down required rate increases so dramatic they would guarantee recession, lacking courage to act preemptively—a political calculation that persists in modern central banking.
  • Banking system fragmentation risk: United States banned interstate branch banking while Canada allowed it, resulting in zero Canadian bank failures during the Great Depression versus 9,000 American bank failures by 1933. Deposit insurance and faster abandonment of the gold standard would have prevented money supply collapse more effectively than interest rate manipulation, addressing liquidity rather than solvency concerns.
  • Shadow banking expansion threat: Private credit markets now constitute 80% of lending versus 20% from formal banks, a proportion that grows as capital requirements and regulations push activity outside traditional banking. This shadow system connects to insurance companies and has unclear leverage and liquidity lines back to banks, creating potential systemic risk without clear regulatory framework or understanding of contagion mechanisms.

What It Covers

Tyler Cowen interviews Andrew Ross Sorkin about his book examining the 1929 stock market crash. They debate whether pre-crash prices represented rational speculation on America's future prosperity, discuss Federal Reserve independence, banking regulation evolution, and draw parallels between 1929 financial dynamics and modern challenges including private credit markets and cryptocurrency regulation.

Key Questions Answered

  • Pre-crash valuations debate: Stock prices before 1929 crash may have been rational bets on America's century of growth, with thirty-year returns from 1929-1959 delivering approximately 6% real returns despite the Depression. The crash severity resulted from policy mistakes and unlucky events like World War Two rather than fundamental overvaluation, suggesting speculators were more correct than contemporary critics like Irving Fisher.
  • Leverage amplification mechanics: Individual investors in 1929 used 10-to-1 margin loans from proliferating brokerage houses, meaning a 50% stock decline triggered forced liquidations of not just equities but homes and other assets. This leverage dynamic, not just price levels, created the cascading crisis—a pattern repeated in 2008 with subprime mortgages where underwater homeowners couldn't meet payment obligations.
  • Federal Reserve political constraints: Fed board members' diaries from the 1920s reveal they feared Congressional backlash after raising rates in 1920-1921, viewing themselves as an experimental institution. They recognized speculation was excessive but believed tamping it down required rate increases so dramatic they would guarantee recession, lacking courage to act preemptively—a political calculation that persists in modern central banking.
  • Banking system fragmentation risk: United States banned interstate branch banking while Canada allowed it, resulting in zero Canadian bank failures during the Great Depression versus 9,000 American bank failures by 1933. Deposit insurance and faster abandonment of the gold standard would have prevented money supply collapse more effectively than interest rate manipulation, addressing liquidity rather than solvency concerns.
  • Shadow banking expansion threat: Private credit markets now constitute 80% of lending versus 20% from formal banks, a proportion that grows as capital requirements and regulations push activity outside traditional banking. This shadow system connects to insurance companies and has unclear leverage and liquidity lines back to banks, creating potential systemic risk without clear regulatory framework or understanding of contagion mechanisms.

Notable Moment

Sorkin reveals his grandfather worked as a messenger boy in October 1929, witnessed someone jump from a window during the crash, and consequently refused to buy a single share of stock during his entire 91-year life. This personal anecdote illustrates how the crash created generational trauma that fundamentally altered American investment behavior and risk tolerance for decades.

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Episode Transcript

Conversations with Tyler is produced by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Bridging the gap between academic ideas and real world problems. Learn more at mercatus.org. For a full transcript of every conversation enhanced with helpful links, visit conversationswithtyler.com. Hello, everyone, and welcome back to conversations with Tyler. Today, I'm chatting with Andrew Ross Sorkin. He's an award winning journalist for The New York Times and a co anchor at Squawk Box, CSNBC's signature morning program. He's also founder and editor at large of DealBook published by The New York Times. He's the best selling author of Too Big to Fail, coproducer of a film adaptation of the same, nominated for 11 Emmy Awards, and he is also cocreator of the drama series, Billions, on Showtime. But most importantly, he has a new book out, 1929, Inside the Greatest Crash in History and How It Shattered a Nation. Andrew, welcome. Thank you so much for having me. It's a privilege. The 1929 stock prices right before the crash, were they really a bubble? Doesn't America have an amazing century to come? And arguably, those prices were were too low, and the so called speculators are the heroes of this story. Oh goodness. What a place to start. You know? Yes and no. In some ways, so many of these companies clearly represented the future. You know, you think about an RCA and radio and the future of radio and what that represented. But, you know, three years later, I think RCA was sitting at $3. And on a split adjusted basis, it has had been up in, you know, multi $100. So, yes, that you could argue that they were betting on a future that truly was, you know, better than people thought. But, you know, the chasm between 1929 and frankly, you know, the end of World War two was a long and tortured period. No? Sure. But if we look at thirty year returns, we find in American history, like any thirty year period, stocks do quite well, six to 7%, and most of the gains come just in a few of the years in the thirty year period. That seems to be the case even if you bought at the peak in 1929. By 1959, you would have had a real return, something like 6%. A lot of the gains coming later, but that's not unusual. And even then, like, World War two that it was so bad seems like a super unlucky event. So ex ante, you might have expected something even better. No. Look. For sure, it has paid to be a professional optimist, a professional speculator, if you will, way more over the course of the last hundred years than it has ever paid to be a professional Cassandra, or professional skeptic. No doubt. The question is what the time horizon is, always. And so if you are looking out thirty years, Tyler, you're a 100% right. If you're looking at five years …

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