Will the U.S. Go to War With Iran? — with Karim Sadjadpour

What It Covers

Carnegie Endowment senior fellow Karim Sadjadpour analyzes the escalating US-Iran standoff with Scott Galloway, covering military strike probability, nuclear deal feasibility, regional ally positions, and long-term scenarios for regime change. The conversation maps the strategic calculus of Trump, Khamenei, Gulf states, and Israel as the largest US Middle East military buildup since 2003 unfolds.

Key Questions Answered

• •Strike Probability: Prediction markets place military action against Iran at roughly 60-67% likelihood before March. The US has deployed its largest Middle East military buildup since the 2003 Iraq invasion, including sustained aerial refueling infrastructure suggesting a prolonged campaign rather than a single strike. Trump has rolled the dice on Iran three prior times — exiting the nuclear deal, assassinating Soleimani, and Operation Midnight Hammer — and considers each a vindication.
• •Diplomatic Dead Zone: A negotiated deal currently has no viable overlap between US and Iranian positions. Washington demands zero uranium enrichment, curtailed missile programs, and an end to proxy support for Hezbollah and the Houthis. Tehran refuses to discuss anything beyond limited nuclear talks and rejects zero enrichment outright. Supreme Leader Khamenei, 86, views capitulation under pressure as an existential threat to the regime rather than a survival strategy.
• •Khamenei as the Variable: The regime's survival logic centers on one man whose singular ideology is resistance against America. Unlike the pre-revolution Shah's government — whose elite held Western passports and could relocate to Los Angeles or London — the current leadership has no viable exit plan. This makes the "golden parachute" diplomatic off-ramp, historically useful in conflicts like Rwanda, structurally difficult to execute with the Islamic Republic's inner circle.
• •Gulf State Ambivalence: Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar publicly oppose a US strike and deny airspace access, fearing Iranian retaliation against their own infrastructure. Their core concern is a "hit and run" scenario — the US strikes, then pivots to Venezuela or Taiwan, leaving Gulf nations exposed to Iranian missile, drone, and proxy retaliation. The UAE, which built a global transport and technology hub over five decades, calculates it has far more to lose from regional escalation than the US does.
• •Regime Fragility vs. Day-After Risk: Iran is arguably at its weakest point in decades — air defenses degraded, regional proxies decimated, economy under maximum pressure, and roughly 80% of the population opposing the regime. However, historical data shows only one in five authoritarian collapses produces democracy; over 80% result in another authoritarian government. Russia post-Soviet and Egypt post-Mubarak are cited as cases where popular uprisings produced Putin and Sisi respectively.
• •Soft Power Gap: The Reagan-era institutional infrastructure — Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, National Endowment for Democracy — that aligned US foreign policy with Soviet citizens' desire for freedom has atrophied. No equivalent apparatus currently exists to support Iranian opposition or shape post-regime transition. Sadjadpour argues this soft power deficit is as strategically significant as military capability, since bombs can destroy infrastructure but cannot consolidate democratic outcomes.