The third Gulf war: one week on

What It Covers

One week into U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, The Economist examines the conflict's unclear strategic objectives, the Iranian regime's unexpected resilience despite leadership decapitation, a critical interceptor missile shortage threatening Gulf state defenses, and the legacy of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed in the opening hours of the war.

Key Questions Answered

• •Strategic ambiguity in wartime: The U.S. entered this conflict with five simultaneous justifications — nuclear program, missile capabilities, civilian repression, regime change, and historical grievance dating to the 1979 hostage crisis. Military history shows multiple war rationales undermine each other; without a single defined objective, commanders cannot determine what "winning" means or how much sacrifice is acceptable.
• •Regime resilience calculation: Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps numbers hundreds of thousands of ideologically committed personnel who participated in civilian repression and face total loss if the regime falls. Unlike the 1979 revolution — where army units refused to fire on citizens — no mass defections or work stoppages have emerged one week in, suggesting the regime retains functional cohesion despite leadership losses.
• •Interceptor missile depletion timeline: Gulf states fire approximately two interceptors per incoming ballistic missile to achieve reliable interception. Iran launched roughly 400 missiles at Arab countries in the first days, consuming an estimated 800 interceptors — a significant share of annual PAC-3 production of 600 units and THAAD production of just 96 units. At sustained rates, a defense crisis emerges within ten to twelve days.
• •Iran's missile degradation rate: U.S. Joint Chiefs reported Iran's theater ballistic missile launches dropped 86% from day one, with a further 23% decline between Tuesday and Wednesday alone. This slowdown reflects the extreme vulnerability of Iranian missile crews in the field. However, Iran may be conserving remaining stockpiles — estimated at 2,000–2,500 missiles pre-conflict — to overwhelm depleted defenses in a later mass salvo.
• •Global interceptor supply chain consequences: Missile consumption in this conflict directly reduces stocks available for U.S. Pacific forces and Ukraine. Germany recently had an interceptor transfer request denied. European NATO nations, already under-defended on a per-capita and per-square-kilometer basis compared to Gulf states, face compounding shortfalls. Decisions made in this conflict will constrain allied air defense capacity across multiple theaters for years.