Chosen by War: The Rise of Iran’s New Supreme Leader

What It Covers

NYT correspondent Farnaz Fassihi details how Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Iran's assassinated supreme leader, was selected as Iran's third supreme leader through a contested succession process involving Revolutionary Guards, moderate clerics, and competing political factions, with US and Israeli military pressure paradoxically accelerating the appointment of a hardline successor.

Key Questions Answered

• •Succession mechanics: Iran's 88-member Assembly of Experts holds constitutional authority to appoint supreme leaders, but the actual selection process runs parallel through Revolutionary Guards generals, former intelligence chiefs, and political factions conducting direct lobbying campaigns. Understanding this dual-track system — formal clerical vote plus military backchanneling — is essential for accurately reading future Iranian leadership transitions.
• •Wartime consolidation: The Revolutionary Guards backed Mojtaba unanimously because his appointment guaranteed continuity of their political, economic, and military grip on Iran. The Guards control the economy, outrank the conventional military, and command Iran's war operations. Any supreme leader they oppose would face institutional obstruction, making their endorsement a prerequisite for governing effectively during active conflict.
• •Moderate opposition strategy: Reformist factions, led by National Security Council head Ali Larijani and President Pezeshkian, attempted to block Mojtaba by presenting testimony from the late Ayatollah's two closest aides and an unsealed written will stating Khamenei explicitly did not want family members to succeed him. This nearly forced a revote before Guards generals conducted a direct counter-lobbying campaign.
• •Biographical hardline indicators: Mojtaba volunteered as a 17-year-old soldier in the Iran-Iraq War, studied Shia jurisprudence in Qom, then managed security and military affairs inside his father's office. Sources link him to alleged manipulation of the 2009 presidential election in Ahmadinejad's favor and to coordinating Basij paramilitary crackdowns on Green Movement protesters, resulting in over 30 deaths and 300 detentions.
• •Strategic miscalculation risk: US and Israeli strikes that killed the previous supreme leader, along with public threats to eliminate his successor, removed the conditions under which a moderate candidate could have plausibly won selection. Analysts and Iranian sources argue this military pressure produced the opposite of its stated goal — replacing one hardline leader with a younger, potentially more ideologically rigid successor whose personal losses deepen his motivation for confrontation.