Ep. 369: Philippa Foot's Naturalistic Ethics (Part One)

What It Covers

Philippa Foot's 2001 book Natural Goodness challenges noncognitivist ethics by arguing moral judgments derive from natural facts about human flourishing, similar to biological evaluations of plants and animals, reviving Aristotelian naturalism.

Key Questions Answered

• •Aristotelian Categoricals: Foot evaluates individuals against species-level standards of self-maintenance and reproduction, arguing deep oak roots are good because they enable survival, not because survival itself is inherently valuable but because that defines the life cycle.
• •Practical Rationality as Virtue: Moral reasons for action need not connect to individual desires or self-interest. Practical rationality functions as one virtue among others, incorporating considerations beyond hypothetical imperatives, challenging both Humean sentiment theory and Kantian categorical imperatives.
• •Rejecting Noncognitivism: Expressivists reduce moral claims to attitudes (cheering or booing), but Foot argues moral facts exist independent of feelings. Rudeness reflects objective deficiency in human functioning, not merely disapproval, grounding ethics in natural human capacities rather than subjective preferences.
• •Beyond Hypothetical Imperatives: A skilled thief possesses technical knowledge but lacks good practical rationality because goodness of will precedes rational action. Moral considerations integrate with prudential ones in unified practical reasoning, not as separate competing systems requiring special motivation.